docsSecurity Policies

Security Policies

Reins uses three decision types for every tool action:

DecisionBehavior
ALLOWExecute immediately
ASKPrompt for human approval
DENYBlock automatically

Default Policy (Balanced)

ModuleActionDecision
FileSystemreadALLOW
FileSystemwriteASK
FileSystemdeleteDENY
Shellbash, execASK
BrowserscreenshotALLOW
Browsernavigate, click, type, evaluateASK
GatewaysendMessageASK
Networkfetch, requestASK
(everything else)ASK

Built-in Rules

Always blocked (CRITICAL)

  • rm -rf / or rm -rf ~/ — recursive root/home deletion
  • mkfs — filesystem format
  • Fork bomb pattern :(){ :|:& }
  • dd to disk device

Blocked by default (HIGH, user-overridable)

  • DROP TABLE/DATABASE/SCHEMA
  • git push --force
  • TRUNCATE TABLE
  • DELETE FROM <table> without WHERE clause
  • Pipe-to-shell (| bash, | sh)

Protected file paths (writes blocked)

  • ~/.ssh
  • ~/.gnupg
  • ~/.env
  • ~/.openclaw/clawreins
  • /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow

Policy Merge Order

Policies are evaluated highest-to-lowest priority:

  1. Reins Cloud org policies — CRITICAL rules are immutable
  2. Reins Cloud team policies
  3. Local overrides at ~/.openclaw/clawreins/policy.json
  4. Built-in defaults

Editing Policies

reins policy

Policies are stored as plain JSON at ~/.openclaw/clawreins/policy.json and are editable directly.

Example policy.json:

{
  "modules": {
    "FileSystem": {
      "read":   "ALLOW",
      "write":  "ASK",
      "delete": "DENY"
    },
    "Shell": {
      "bash": "ASK",
      "exec": "ASK"
    },
    "Browser": {
      "screenshot": "ALLOW",
      "navigate":   "ASK",
      "click":      "ASK",
      "type":       "ASK",
      "evaluate":   "ASK"
    },
    "Network": {
      "fetch":   "ASK",
      "request": "ASK"
    }
  },
  "defaultAction": "ASK"
}

OWASP Coverage

Reins maps across three OWASP frameworks. Coverage is marked ✅ (addressed), ⚠️ (partial), or 🗺️ (roadmap).

OWASP MCP Top 10

The OWASP MCP Top 10 covers security risks specific to Model Context Protocol servers and tool ecosystems.

RiskDescriptionReins Coverage
MCP01 — Token MismanagementHard-coded credentials and secrets in config or protocol logsAPI_KEYS_EXPOSURE, DEFAULT_WEAK_CREDENTIALS
MCP02 — Privilege Escalation via Scope CreepPermissions expanding beyond intended boundariesSHELL_COMMAND_ALLOWLIST, SENSITIVE_DIRECTORIES, FILE_PERMISSIONS
MCP03 — Tool PoisoningMalicious tool descriptions altering agent behavior⚠️ MCP empty-matcher hook intercepts all MCP calls; CONTROL_UI_AUTH
MCP04 — Supply Chain AttacksCompromised dependencies or connectors⚠️ NODEJS_VERSION (CVE detection)
MCP05 — Command Injection & ExecutionUntrusted input used to construct shell commands or code✅ Shell DENY rules, destructive classifier, protected paths
MCP06 — Intent Flow SubversionManipulation of agent decision logic and intended flow⚠️ Memory risk forecaster (drift score, salami index)
MCP07 — Insufficient AuthenticationWeak or missing auth on MCP infrastructureDEFAULT_WEAK_CREDENTIALS, WEBHOOK_AUTH
MCP08 — Lack of Audit and TelemetryNo visibility into MCP server operations✅ Immutable decisions JSONL, Reins Cloud upload
MCP09 — Shadow MCP ServersUnsupervised MCP instances outside governance🗺️ Roadmap: reins inventory
MCP10 — Context Injection & Over-SharingSensitive context leaking across tasks or users🗺️ Roadmap

OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026

The OWASP ASI Top 10 addresses autonomous agent systems with multi-step decision-making and persistent memory.

RiskDescriptionReins Coverage
ASI01 — Agent Goal HijackRedirecting agent objectives via prompt injection or tool output manipulation⚠️ Memory risk forecaster (drift score)
ASI02 — Tool Misuse & ExploitationAgents misusing legitimate tools due to prompt injection or misalignment✅ Shell DENY rules, destructive classifier, irreversibility scorer
ASI03 — Agent Identity & Privilege AbuseExploiting inherited credentials or delegated permissions⚠️ FILE_PERMISSIONS, SENSITIVE_DIRECTORIES
ASI04 — Agentic Supply Chain CompromiseTampered tools, models, or agent personas⚠️ NODEJS_VERSION; 🗺️ skill scanning (roadmap)
ASI05 — Unexpected Code ExecutionAgents generating or executing attacker-controlled code✅ Shell DENY rules, pipe-to-shell blocking
ASI06 — Memory & Context PoisoningPersistent corruption of agent memory or RAG stores⚠️ Memory risk forecaster; 🗺️ SOUL.md/MEMORY.md integrity (roadmap)
ASI07 — Insecure Inter-Agent CommunicationSpoofed or intercepted agent-to-agent messages🗺️ Roadmap
ASI08 — Cascading Agent FailuresSingle-point faults propagating through multi-agent workflows🗺️ Roadmap
ASI09 — Human-Agent Trust ExploitationOver-reliance on agents leading to unsafe approvals✅ HITL approvals, OOB token delivery (agent cannot self-approve)
ASI10 — Rogue AgentsCompromised or misaligned agents diverging from intended behavior⚠️ Cooldown escalation, memory risk forecaster; 🗺️ behavioral anomaly detection (roadmap)

OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10

The OWASP AST Top 10 focuses on skill-level risks in agentic runtimes.

RiskDescriptionReins Coverage
AST01 — Skill InjectionMalicious instructions in skill filesCONTROL_UI_AUTH, WEBHOOK_AUTH
AST02 — Trust Prompt ConfigurationMisconfigured trust boundaries🗺️ Roadmap
AST03 — Excessive PermissionsOver-privileged agent accessSHELL_COMMAND_ALLOWLIST, SENSITIVE_DIRECTORIES, FILE_PERMISSIONS
AST04 — Runtime Supply ChainCompromised runtime dependencies🗺️ Roadmap
AST05 — Memory IntegritySOUL.md / MEMORY.md tampering🗺️ Roadmap
AST06 — Supply ChainVulnerable dependenciesNODEJS_VERSION (CVE detection)
AST07 — Sandbox EscapeAgent breaking out of isolationSANDBOX_ISOLATION, BROWSER_UNSANDBOXED
AST08 — Network ExposureUnprotected network interfacesGATEWAY_BINDING, HTTPS_TLS, RATE_LIMITING
AST09 — Secrets ExposureLeaked credentials and tokensAPI_KEYS_EXPOSURE, DEFAULT_WEAK_CREDENTIALS
AST10 — Behavioral AnomalyDetecting unexpected agent behavior patterns🗺️ Roadmap

Environment Toggles

CLAWREINS_DESTRUCTIVE_GATING=on    # default: on
CLAWREINS_BULK_THRESHOLD=20        # bulk delete threshold, default: 20
CLAWREINS_CONFIRM_THRESHOLD=80     # irreversibility score requiring CONFIRM token